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A bstract. This paper reports the analysis of an industrial implementa­
tion of the session-layer of a load-balancing software system. This soft­
ware comprises 7.5 thousand lines of C code. It is used for distribution 
of the print jobs among several document processors (workers). A large 
part of this commercially used software system has been modeled closely 
and analyzed using process-algebraic techniques. Several critical issues 
were discovered. Since the model was close to the code, all problems that 
were found in the model, could be traced back to the actual code result­
ing in concrete suggestions for improvement of the code. All in all, the 
analysis significantly improved the quality of this real-life system.
1 In trodu ction
In this paper we consider the following real-life industrial case study. The ITP 
Document Platform (developed and marketed by Aia Software BV) enables or­
ganizations to produce critical business documents in a scalable and personalized 
environment. This application has a load-balancer, a process kernel tha t makes 
diverse document processors and clients communicate with each other, distribute 
and execute tasks. This system is used satisfactorily for several years (in 2007 
in over 25 countries by more than 800 customers). However, it comes every now 
and then in an undesirable state. The goal of the project was to  investigate to 
what extent the inter-process communication and synchronization of this load­
balancer could be modeled and analyzed. The desired results had to be detailed 
enough to give an advise on how to avoid these undesirable situations, and to 
suggest concrete code changes.
* This research was supported by SenterNovem Innovation Voucher Inv053967. The 
fourth author has also been supported by NWO Hefboom project 641.000.407.
The project has been performed in the following phases: In a discussion with 
two employees of Aia Software (Stefan ten Hoedt and Rene Schreurs) we obtained 
the overall idea of the structure and the behavior of the software in general 
and the parts to be modeled in particular. The relevant parts were modeled in 
mCRL2 [1]. The session layer of the load-balancer protocol was modeled quite 
close to the C code. Both the higher-level application layer and the underlying 
TCP-socket layer were modeled in an abstract manner. The code and the model 
were reviewed by the LaQuSo-modeler and the Aia-developer in order to achieve 
the maximal matching. This led to a number of changes in the model, as well 
as to a number of questions about the code and a number of concrete desired 
properties tha t could be analyzed. The model was analyzed with the help of the 
model-checking techniques of the mCRL2 Toolset w.r.t deadlock-freedom and 
a number of other starvation and consistency properties tha t were formulated 
together with the client. This revealed 6 problems in the C code. These problems 
were accepted by Aia Software and incorporated to the production release of the 
software system.
The type of analysis presented in this paper is as such not new. It was 
performed before using different kinds of model checkers (e.g. imperative [2] 
and declarative [1]: see also the related work paragraph below). Noteworthy 
characteristics of our work are tha t the model is very close to the code, the code 
is relatively large (7500 lines), the code has been running within a commercial 
product for years and it has been improved several times while problems still 
kept occurring, errors have been found tha t led to code improvements and finally, 
problems regarding the code have not occurred since the code was corrected. This 
project was done with a model checker based on Process Algebra [3]. It is the 
first time tha t a project with such characteristics was achieved with a model 
checker based on Process Algebra.
Related Work Many projects study the verification of the design of a software 
system. Karl Palmskog in his Master Thesis [4] studied using the SPIN model 
checker the design of a Session Management Protocol developed at Ericsson 
Research. He has discovered a design flaw. This study was done on the level 
of the design without looking carefully at the implemented code. Also on the 
design level, in [5] He and Janicki present a verification of a Wireless Transaction 
Protocol design in SPIN. Another verification project concerning model checking 
of the design of a software system in mCRL2 is the parking garage project done 
by Mathijssen and Pretorius [6]. In [7] Brock and Jackson prove correctness of 
an industrial implementation of a ‘fault tolerant com puter’ by creating a small 
abstract model in CSP.
A real-life code example was recently studied by Hessel and Pettersson [8] 
with nice results. In contrast to our project, they do not model the code but use 
a black-box testing approach.
In [9] an application of the Verisoft model checking approach to a software 
system from Lucent is presented. The model checking was applied as a part of 
the testing procedure during the software development. The paper reports about
a large number of revealed errors, most of which indicated incorrect variable 
initializations.
A framework for C code analysis with CADP [10] is presented in [11], where 
the methods of process graph extraction and generation of an LTS for a C 
program are described. In [12] a model checker MOPS was used to model-check 
safety properties of single-threaded C programs. This paper reports on automatic 
analysis of million lines of code.
The Java Pathfinder tool is described in [13] as a tool tha t is used to find 
deadlocks and other behavioral properties in java programs. The tool has been 
used to analyse software systems at NASA. It is also used as the back-end model 
checker of the Bandera project [14]. The Bandera project uses abstraction tech­
niques based on abstraction-based program specialization: a combination of ab­
stract interpretation and partial evaluation.
Research at Microsoft Corporation led by Thomas Ball has shown significant 
results for a restricted subset of programs: device drivers. Using an automatic 
analysis engine - called SLAM - tha t combines model checking with symbolic 
execution for the language C, they have successfully found many errors in many 
real-life industrial device drivers [15]. They do not support analysis of multi­
threaded systems.
Probably, the most related work is performed by Holzmann and Smith in [16]. 
Using SPIN they followed the development of a piece of telephone call processing 
software of about 1600 lines of C code. They verified successfully so-called feature 
requirements. They found many errors in different stages of the development.
Organization o f the paper The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the case study and the problems tha t were to be investigated. Section 3 presents 
the mCRL2 language and the toolset and the way they were used in the modeling 
of the case study. Section 4 presents the details on the analysis with the mCRL2 
toolset and the issues th a t were detected. Section 5 contains conclusions and 
possibilities for future work. In the Appendix a part of the C code and the 
corresponding part of the mCRL2 model are presented. The whole mCRL2 model 
can be found in the Appendix of [17].
2 In telligent T ext P rocessin g  (IT P ) and its Load-B alancer
The Intelligent Text Processing system is used to prepare large quantities of 
documents to be printed. Sometimes it is done in an interactive way, where 
additional information is being asked from the client during the processing. In 
the early versions of the ITP software the clients could directly communicate 
to the document processors, but with the increased complexity of the process­
ing jobs a coordinating mechanism was needed. The task of the load-balancer is 
to distribute the jobs of the clients to the available document processors, with­
out actually changing the application layer of the client-server communication 
protocol too much (see Figure 1).
Due to the evolutionary way the ITP software was developed in the late 
nineties, the load-balancer has been implemented in C on the Windows platform
Fig. 1. ITP and a Load-Balancer in it.
making use of the Windows Socket Library. The possibility of using a standard 
solution for load-balancing, like the Linux virtual server, has not been used for 
a number of reasons.
A typical use-case scenario of the load-balancer deployment is presented as 
a Message Sequence Chart on Figure 2. There, a client of the load-balancer 
communicates with the client object and a document processor communicates 
with the document processor object. The client sends a request to print and the 
document processor sends a request for work. After tha t the document processor 
object asks the client object for work and gets the answer. At this point the 
client and the document processor objects are linked together by a partnership 
link. Further, the document processor asks for additional data and goes to a 
sleeping state. The client object gets the data from the client and wakes up the 
document processor object. The document processor object transfers the data 
to the document processor.
2.1 Issues and Artifacts
The load-balancer software was developed in the late nineties and has been tested 
both at AIA and at clients’ environments since th a t time. The system has been 
in use in production for quite some time now. During testing and maintenance 
a number of issues with the software have been fixed, but some items remained 
unsolved till the beginning of our project.
Most of these ‘difficult’ issues could be classified as follows:
— the load-balancer would get to a state where it did not respond at all to the 
requests of neither clients nor document processors;
— the load-balancer would ignore the document processors tha t were free and 
willing to accept jobs;
request to print
C lient object Docum ent processor object Docum ent processorClient
work?
work?
yes! (partners)
w a ke -u p  : get data
get data
data
w a ke-up  : data ready
process data
Fig. 2 . A typical use-case scenario of the load-balancer.
— a client would not get any response from the load-balancer about the status 
of its jobs.
These issues occurred in rare situations, mostly on particular hardware configu­
rations. Reproducing such errors was very difficult or impossible. Restarting the 
system solved the issue but it could occur again somewhere in the future.
The company provided the source code in C for windows (7681 lines) and 
the application layer protocol documentation. Further information was commu­
nicated during meetings, via phone calls and e-mail. Analysis of the artifacts re­
vealed th a t the system was a multi-threaded Windows application using mutual 
exclusion primitives (mutexes, semaphores) and multiple event synchronization 
(WaitForMultipleObjects). For the asynchronous I/O  and the network commu­
nication the Windows Socket Administration and call-back functions were used. 
The reverse engineering of the design revealed the structure of the load-balancer 
(see Figure 3). Here each client and document processor object has a request 
queue and a partnership link to a possible partner. Each such object implements 
a finite state machine th a t first waits for one of the two events, either a network 
socket event or a wake-up event from a partner. After that, a certain action is 
performed and the object proceeds to a new state.
Based on the source code and the revealed architecture of the load-balancer 
the following properties were considered to be im portant for the further analysis.
Fig. 3. Architecture of the load-balancer.
— The software should be free from deadlocks.
— Certain log messages are considered to be of critical importance. These 
should never occur as they indicate tha t there is something fundamentally 
wrong with the system.
— The partnership links should be consistent, e.g., if the partner of A  is B  > 0 
(0 means no partner), then the partner of B  is A  or 0.
— Waiting for a partner should only be done if the partner link is not 0. This 
boils down to the fact tha t a document processor may not be in a sleeping 
state if it has no partner (except when a request is pending to  it).
— The number of times a thread acquires a lock should be limited. In case a 
lock is acquired a multiple number of times it has to be released the same 
number of times. If a thread acquires a lock in a loop, a certain bound 
induced by the operating system can be reached, resulting in an undesired 
behavior. Moreover, a high number of nested lock acquisitions may indicate 
a logical error in the program.
— The number of requests th a t are pending in the system should be limited.
3 M odeling  in m CRL2
To check the desired properties part of the system had to  be formally modelled in 
a language tha t supports model-checking. For the reasons of available expertise 
we decided to use mCRL2 and its toolset.
mCRL2 [1] is a process algebraic language tha t includes data and time. It is an 
extension of the language ¡iCRL [18] with multi-actions, built-in data types and 
local communication functions instead of a single global one. mCRL2 is basically 
intended to study description and analysis techniques for (large) distributed sys­
tems. The abbreviation mCRL2 stands for milli Common Representation Lan­
guage 2.
An mCRL2 specification consists of two parts. The first part specifies the 
data types, the second part defines the processes. Data are represented as terms 
of some sort, for example 2, c o s ( p i ) , and concat(L 1,L 2) could be terms of sort 
natural number, real number and list, respectively.
The process equations are defined in the following way. Starting from a set 
Act of actions th a t can be parameterized with data, processes are defined by 
means of guarded recursive equations and the following operations.
First, there is a constant 5 (5 ^  Act) tha t cannot perform any action and is 
called deadlock or inaction.
Next, there are the sequential composition operation • and the alternative 
composition operation + . The process x  • y  first behaves as x  and if x  successfully 
terminates continues to behave as y. The process x  +  y  can either do an action 
of x  and continue to behave as x  or do an action of y  and continue to behave as 
y .
Interleaving parallelism is modeled by the operation ||. The process x  || y  is 
the result of interleaving actions of x  and y , except tha t actions from x  and y 
also synchronize to multiactions. So a || b =  a • b +  b • a +  a | b. The communication 
operation r  allows multiactions to communicate: parameterized actions a(d) and 
b(d') in r{ a|b^c}(a(d) | b(d')) communicate to c(d), provided d =  d'.
To enforce tha t actions in processes x  and y  synchronize, we can prevent 
actions from happening on their own, using the encapsulation operator dH . The 
process dH (x) can perform all actions of x  except tha t actions in the set H  are 
blocked. So, in d{a 6}(r{a|b^c}(x || y)) the actions a and b are forced to  syn­
chronize to c. Another way to restrict process behaviour is the allow operation. 
By specifying a list of multiactions one can prohibit all other multiactions by 
renaming them to 5. So V{a|b} (a || b) =  a | b.
We assume the existence of a special action t  ( t  ^  Act) tha t is internal and 
cannot be directly observed. The hiding operator t j  renames the actions in the 
set I  to t  . By hiding all internal communications of a process only the external 
actions remain.
The following two operators combine data with processes. The sum operator 
J2d-D P(d) describes the process tha t can execute the process p(d)  for some value 
d selected from the sort D. The conditional operator _ ^  describes the i f  - 
then-else. The process b ^  x  o y  (where b is a boolean) has the behavior of x  if 
b is true and the behavior of y  if b is false. The expression b ^  x  is a syntactic 
sugar representing the i f  -then  construction. It is an abbreviation to b ^  x  o 5.
3.1  D e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  m C R L 2 la n g u a g e
3.2  T h e  m C R L 2 T o o lse t
The mCRL2 Toolset (h ttp ://w w w .m crl2 .o rg ) has been developed at Technical 
University of Eindhoven to support formal reasoning about systems specified in 
mCRL2. It is based on term  rewriting techniques and on formal transformation 
of process-algebraic and data terms. At the moment it allows to generate state 
spaces, search for deadlocks and particular actions, perform symbolic optimiza­
tions for mCRL2 specifications and simulate them.
The tool set is constructed around a restricted form of mCRL2, namely the 
Linear Process Specification (LPS) format. An LPS contains a single process 
definition of the linear fo r m :
proc P(x:D) =  ^  ^  Ci(x,yi) ^  a i ( x , y i )  • P (g (x ,y i))
iEJ yi-Ei
i n i t  P(do);
where data expressions of the form d (x i , . . .  , x n ) contain at most free variables 
from { x i , . . .  , x n }, I  is a finite index set, and for i G I  the following are:
— ci ( x , y i ) are boolean expressions representing the conditions,
— ai ( x , y i )  is a multiaction a ^ f 1 (x,yi ))  | ••• | ani ( f n i (x,yi )) ,  where f k (x,yi )  
(for 1 < k < n i ) are the parameters of action name ak,
— gi (x, yi ) is an expression of sort D  representing the next state of the process 
definition P ;
— d0 is a closed data expression;
— 2 Pi is a shorthand for p 1 +  • • • +  p n , where I  =  { 1 , . . . ,  n}.
The form of the summand as described above is sometimes presented as the 
condition-action -effect rule. In a particular state d and for some data value e 
the multiaction a i (d, e) can be done if condition ci (d, e) holds. The effect of the 
action on the state is given by the fact tha t the next state is gi ( x , y i ).
The tool m crl22 lps checks whether a certain specification is a well formed 
mCRL2 and attem pts to transform it into a linearized (i.e. LPS) form (See [19] 
for the detail of the linearization). All other tools use this linearized format as 
their starting point (see Figure 4).
These tools come in four kinds:
1. a tool (xsim) to step through the process specified in the LPS;
2. a tool ( lp s 2 l t s )  to generate the labeled transition system (LTS) underlying 
a given LPS;
3. several tools to optimize the LPSs:
(a) lpsrew r, normalizes an LPS by rewriting the data terms in it;
(b) lp sconste lm , removes data parameters th a t are constant throughout 
any run of the LPS;
(c) lpsparelm , reduces the state space of the transition system by removing 
the data parameters and sum variables tha t do not influence the behavior 
of the system,
(d) lp s s tru c te lm , expands variables of compound data types;
4. a tool (lpspp) to print the linearized specification.
.m c r l2
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lp sd a ta e lm  
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Fig. 4. The mCRL2 Toolset (www.mcrl2.org)
3.3 The Load-Balancer in mCRL2
For the modeling we concentrated on the session layer of the protocol. This 
layer is responsible for controlling the connections with the clients and the 
document processors, e.g., establishing, breaking the connection, handling non­
expected connection breaks and network errors. Sending and receiving of data 
goes through this layer as well.
The lower-level interface (back-end) of the session layer protocol goes to  the 
Windows Socket Administration (WSA) library. This library is a part of the 
operating system and is responsible for sending and accepting network socket 
events from the application. In our mCRL2 model WSA is modelled as a part 
of the environment.
The high-level interface (front-end) of the session layer performs calls to  the 
application layer of the protocol. This happens when a certain part of data is 
received from a client or a document processor in a state when data is expected, 
or a connection is broken and this fact has to be noticed by the application 
layer (sometimes the session layer can close the session itself and no action from 
the application layer is required). The code of the application layer happens to 
be a rather large piece of homogeneous code, a large case distinction so to say. 
We modelled it by making an over-approximation of all possible behaviors and 
choosing them  in a non-deterministic way. By doing this we ended up with less 
than ten alternatives for the application layer.
The model of the session layer follows the C code in a way to make it as precise 
as possible. The model resembles the request handling and the network events 
handling in most details, following the state-transition paradigm implemented in
the code. Appendix B presents a part of the mCRL2 models th a t corresponds to 
the request handling session layer part of the C-implementation in Appendix A. 
The model and the code in these appendices follow each other rather closely. 
The sizes of the two specifications are more or less the same.
The shared variables and arrays tha t are used for inter-thread communi­
cations are modelled by separate processes. Parts of the operating system are 
modelled by processes as well. Below an mCRL2 process for the mutual exclusion 
primitive of Windows (MSDN Mutex objects) is presented. A thread can acquire 
a mutex a multiple number of times and has to release it the same number of 
times.
Lock( ow ner:N at, count:N at) =
''y^ (owner = =  0 V owner = =  t id ) ^  lock(tid) • Lock(tid, count +  1)
t i d  :Pos
+  (owner > 0) ^  unlock(N at2Pos(ow ner))•
Lock(if (count = =  1, 0, owner), In t2N at(coun t — 1))
+  (count > nM axLock) ^  _error(M axLock) • 5;
The process Lock has two natural numbers as parameters. The first one repre­
sents the id of the thread tha t owns the mutex, or is equal to 0 if the mutex 
is free. The second param eter is used to count how many times the mutex has 
been acquired.
The actions lock and unlock are parameterized by positive numbers represent­
ing the id of the locking/unlocking thread. Such a thread would perform a corre­
sponding Jock or unlock action parameterized with its id. The two corresponding 
actions (with and without the underscore) are then forced to synchronize by the 
process defining the entire system.
The first summand of the process Lock says tha t it can be acquired (by 
performing a Jock action) by a thread with its id represented by the variable 
tid . This is allowed for a thread with any id in case the mutex is free (condition 
owner = =  0) or for the owner thread (owner = =  tid ). After this acquisition the 
lock is owned by the thread identified by tid  and the acquisition number counter 
is incremented.
The second summand says th a t a non-free mutex can be unlocked by the 
owner. Here we use N at2Pos to cast the value of the natural variable owner to 
the positive number. This function maps 0 to 1 and any number bigger than 1 to 
itself. Given the condition owner > 0, this cast is always an identity mapping. 
The function In t2N at is used to  cast the integral value of count — 1 to the natural 
number. It maps the negative integers to 0 and does not change the non-negative 
integers. It can be shown tha t owner > 0 = ^  count > 0 is and invariant of 
the Lock process. Therefore, this cast is also an identity mapping.
The third summand lets the process perform an _error action if the value of 
count reaches a certain limit nM axLock. In this way, by checking for absence 
of _error actions, one can prove that the mutex is acquired in a nested way less 
than nMaxLock number of times.
3.4 Modeling the Properties
It turned out tha t all the desired properties (except for the deadlock absence) 
could be modeled as safety properties and checked by adding error actions to the 
model and check for them. For example, the partner consistency property from 
Section 2.1 is modelled as a summand in the SharedConnection process:
E  E  (n =  0 A getpartner(connections.n) =  0 A
c i d :N a t  n : N a t  , , / ,• \ / ■ i \getpartner (connections .n) =  cid ) ^
setConnectionPartner(cid,n)  • _error( W rongPartners) • 5
Here getpartner (connections .n) gives the current partner link value for the con­
nection n. Once an attem pt to change the partner of connection cid to the 
value n  is performed by one of the threads (by performing the correspond­
ing _setConnectionPartner action with the actual parameters), the condition is 
checked and if it is true, the error action is enabled. The condition says that 
neither n  nor the partner of connection n  is 0 (meaning ‘no partner’) and the 
partner of n  is not cid . The latter condition means the actual partnership link 
inconsistency between n  and c id .
4 A nalysis and Issues
The model has been analyzed for the absence of deadlocks and for validity of 
certain properties. These properties were incorporated in the model itself so 
that an _error action would occur if the property is violated. In this way the 
verification is performed by the explicit generation of the entire state-space and 
by looking for the _error actions and the deadlocks. Once one of this is found in 
a particular state, a minimal trace to this state gives a counterexample.
Performing the analysis takes only a few steps tha t can be activated from 
the command line. To give the reader an idea how this is done in practice, 
we give the actual commands with their actual parameters and options. As 
the first step, the linearization of the model takes place: with the command 
m crl22lps IT Ppatched.m crl2  IT P p a tch ed .lp s  tha t produces the linearized 
version of the model. Next, we apply the optimization steps on the LPS: lp srew r 
IT P p a tch ed .lp s  | lp sco n ste lm  > IT P patch ed _ o p t.lp s. The actual genera­
tion of the transition system and checking for the properties is done with the 
command lp s 2 l t s  -vrD t - a  _ e r ro r  -R j i t t y c  IT P p atch ed _ o p t.lp s  where 
the -D option enables deadlock checking and - a  _ e r ro r  enables checking for 
_error actions. The - t  option enables generation of trace files. In case a deadlock 
or an _error action is found, a trace file is generated with the shortest trace to 
that deadlock state or a state where the _error action is possible. The trace files 
can be printed out with tra c ep p  or simulated in the xsim simulator.
4.1 Experiments and Results
The analysis has been performed by an exhaustive generation of the underlying 
state space using the mCRL2 Toolset. The experiments were carried out on a
computer with 2.6GHz 64 bit AMD CPUs and 128Gb RAM running Linux. 
The execution times and the resulting numbers of states and transitions are 
presented in Table 1. The mCRL2 state space generator uses the depth-first 
search algorithm (by default), and the levels are the levels of depth reached by 
performing the search. The cases with the total number of clients+document 
processors larger than 4 could not be fully analyzed.
clients DPs time levels states transitions
1 1 7m 38s 237 368k 796k
1 2 1h 42m 365 9.8m 21m
2 1 4h 52m 442 28m 61m
1 3 36h 480 209m 455.6m
2 2 7d6h 550 1.5b 31.9b
3 1 9d3h 637 1.8b 38.9b
Table 1. Execution time (days, hours, minutes and seconds), number of levels, number 
of states and number of transitions (thousands, millions and billions) for different 
numbers of clients and document processors (DPs).
4.2 Detected Issues
An early analysis of the model revealed multiple modeling problems. After resolv­
ing these initial modeling problems, the model was compared with the original 
C code by both the modeler and the author of the C code working together. 
This revealed some essential difference between the code and the model. Once 
these differences between the code and the model were resolved, the mCRL2 
tools were applied and the following issues were detected.
— Issue 1. In one case partner links were inconsistent. This was due to the 
fact tha t in one place in the C code the ‘forward’ partner link was set to 0 
and the ‘backward’ one was forgotten. This piece of code was found ‘unclear’ 
during the model-code comparison activity, and later was confirmed to  be 
erroneous by the mCRL2 toolset finding a shortest trace to the property 
violation.
— In two cases a document processor could end-up in a sleeping state without 
having a partner.
• Issue 2. In one case this happened because the client’s partner link was 
set to 0 before actually waking up the document processor (happened 
due to an earlier bug ‘fix’). This problem was found by the model-code 
comparison and later confirmed by the mCRL2 Toolset.
• Issue 3. In another case it was simply forgotten to wake-up the doc­
ument processor. This problem can be clearly explained by a use-case 
scenario in Figure 5. This use-case scenario is similar to the one pre­
sented in Figure 2, with the difference tha t after sending a request for 
data to the client this client disconnects, instead of providing the actual 
data. This problem was found using the tools.
— It also happened tha t critical logs could occur in the program:
• Issue 4. A client could send a request to disconnect to itself in a wrong 
state, because changing of a state was forgotten;
• Issue 5. Request to wake up could lead to an inappropriate state change 
when a document processor was in the middle of a disconnection (found 
to be non-critical).
— Issue 6. The number of requests sent to a client could exceed the preset limit 
and could have possibly been unbounded. This happened when a document 
processor sent a request to disconnect to its partner client and did not break 
the partnership afterwards.
These issues were analyzed and accepted by Aia and led to  modifications of the 
original C code. The corresponding modifications, fixing the problems mentioned 
above, were also brought into the model. The subsequent analysis of the model 
revealed no more property violations.
Most of the issues were detected in the case of 1 client and 1 document 
processor, while the rest in 1-2 or 2-1 situations. Analysis of the situations with 
more clients and document processors did not lead to detection of new issues.
Client C lient object
request to print
Docum ent processor object Docum ent processor
work?
yes! (partners)
w a ke -u p  : get data
get data
w a ke -u p  : client w ent away
work?
disconnect
Fig. 5. A faulty scenario.
5 C onclusions and Future W ork
We modelled the session layer of the ITP load-balancer in mCRL2 such th a t the 
model is close to the actual C code. A number of properties were verified using 
the mCRL2 tool set. This led to the discovery of 6 issues tha t were easily traced 
back to the actual C code. The code was repaired and also the corrections were 
brought into the model. The resulting model was verified with respect to  the 
desired properties by checking the entire state space for several configurations.
mCRL2 could be used successfully in this industrial setting of a load-balancer 
for document production. A part of the operating system services (sockets, locks, 
events, etc.) could also be modeled. Unfortunately the verification could only be 
done on a restricted setting, so an improvement of the tool set is required for 
bigger cases. Also an automatic conformance checking of the model w.r.t. the 
code could be of interest.
Lessons Learned: The case study gave the researchers more confidence 
that real-life examples can actually be dealt with using a close-to-code model. It 
increases the motivation to further improve the power of the analysis tool and 
to start investigating code generation from the model (the proximity to the code 
may simplify code generation).
Aia released the new version with the improved code about half a year ago. 
While previously it happened now and then tha t their systems infrastructure 
came to a standstill and had to be restarted again, this situation never occurred 
anymore with the new release. The infrastructure (which has the load balancer 
as the most critical part) kept running all the time.
They have now a working reference model in mCRL2 of a crucial part of their 
load-balancer software. In principle, they are able to incorporate code changes 
into the model and check whether the properties still hold for the new version. In 
practice, they probably need assistance of the researchers in the beginning. Aia 
has acquired an increased interest in using formal models for analyzing software 
quality aspects, in particular for the most critical parts of their system.
Future Work: In the future an improvement of the tool set could lead to 
model checking of bigger cases. Analyzing more properties of the session layer 
(e.g. verifying client notification of document processor failures) could lead to 
certification of the software. If we want to improve the relation between the 
model and the code, we can consider code generation directly from the model.
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A P art o f C code o f th e  R eq uest H andling
while (Interface->Request != (REQUEST *) NULL){
REQUEST *Req = Interface->Request;
DWORD ID = Req->Connection - Req->Connection->Interface->Connections; 
switch (Req->Request){ 
case requestDisconnect:
/* Partner requests a disconnect */
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_PENDING &&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_SLEEP){ 
if (Req->Connection->State == STATE_EVENT){
CancelEvent (Req->Connection);
} else if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_DISCONNECT&&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_BREAK ){
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Disconnect: Forcing illegal state switch /s->/s on socket /d", 
ShowConnState(Req->Connection->State) ,
ShowConnState(STATE_DISC ONNECT) ,
ID);
} else {
/* Our own connection was already shutting down. Just confirm it. */
}
}
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_BREAK){
Req->Connection->State = STATE_DISCONNECT;
}
break ; 
case requestSend: 
case requestReceive:
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_PENDING &&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_SLEEP){
CONNECTION *Partner;
if (Req->Connection->State == STATE_BREAK ||
Req->Connection->State == STATE_DISCONNECT){
/* Lost connection to client */
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Remote host closed connection unexpectedly on socket /d. " , 
ID);
/* Detach our connection */
} else {
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Send/Receive: Forcing illegal state switch /s->/s on socket /d", 
ShowConnState(Req->Connection->State) ,
ShowConnState(STATE_TRANSACTION),
ID);
}
/* Remove our link to the partner */
WaitHandle (PartnerLock);
Partner = Req->Connection->Partner; 
Req->Connection->Partner = (CONNECTION *) NULL;
/* Wake the partner */
if (Partner != (CONNECTION *) NULL){
if (Partner->Partner == Req->Connection){ 
Partner->Partner = (CONNECTION *) NULL;
}
WakeConnection (Partner);
}
ReleaseMutex (PartnerLock);
/* And close our socket */
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_BREAK){ 
Req->Connection->State = STATE_DISCONNECT;
}
break;
}
/* Start the requested operation */
Req->Connection->State = STATE_TRANSACTION;
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Req->Connection->Protocol = Req->NewState;
Req->Connection->Read = (Req->Request == requestReceive); 
Req->Connection->Write = (Req->Request == requestSend); 
Req->Connection->Size = Req->Size;
Req->Connection->Buffer = Req->Data; 
break ; 
case requestWakeUp:
/* Our partner finished its operations and tries to wake us up. */ 
if (Req->Connection->State == STATE_TRANSACTION){
/*
* We are already awake and handling transactions.
* D o n ’t change anything.
*/
} else if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_PENDING &&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_SLEEP){
/* Detach our connection */
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Wake up: Forcing illegal state switch /s->/s on socket /d", 
ShowConnState(Req->Connection->State) ,
ShowConnState(STATE_TRANSACTION),
ID);
} else {
Req->Connection->State = STATE_TRANSACTION ;
Req->Connection->Read = FALSE;
Req->Connection->Write = FALSE;
}
break;
default:
LogMessage (ClassError, L"INTERNAL ERROR: State / d . " , Req->Request); 
break;
}
Interface->Request = Req->Next;
Free (Req) ;
/* Reset event flag so we w o n ’t delay processing the requests */
SetEvent (Interface->Pending);
}
B C orresponding P art o f th e  m C R L2 M odel
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid:Pos,pending:Bool,nConns:Nat)= 
sum req s : List(REQUEST).
_getRequests(tid,reqs).
(reqs==[]) ->_unlockPartner(tid).
(pending->_setPendingEvent(tid) .
TCP_WaitEvent(tid,nConns)
<>TCP_WaitEvent(tid,nConns)
)
<>_popRequest(tid).
TCP_ProcessRequest(tid,head(reqs),nConns);
TCP_ProcessRequest(tid:Pos,req:REQUEST,nConns:Nat)=
/ first we need to get the state of the connection in the request: 
sum state : STATE._getConnectionState(tid,getcid(req) , state).(
( (getname(req)==requestDisconnect &&
(st at e = = STATE_BREAK | | 
state==STATE_DISCONNECT)
) I I
(getname(req)==requestWakeUp &&
(state==STATE_TRANSACTION || 
state==STATE_DISCONNECT || 
state==STATE_BREAK)
)
)-> TCP_ProcessRequests(t i d ,t r u e ,nConns)<> / do nothing in these cases
(getname(req)==requestDisconnect)->(
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(state = = STATE_PENDING | | 
state==STATE_SLEEP)
-> _setConnectionState(tid,getcid(req),STATE_DISCONNECT). 
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid, true,nConns)<>
/ otherwise log and force.
(state==SOCK_FREE || 
state==SOCK_ACCEPT || 
state==SOCK_READING || 
state==SOCK_WRITING || 
st at e = = S OCK_ SHUTDOWN | | 
state==STATE_TRANSACTION)
-> _log(tid,LogDisconnectForsingIllegalStateSwitch(getcid(req),
STATE_DISCONNECT)).
error(CriticalLog).
_setConnectionState(tid,getcid(req),STATE_DISCONNECT). 
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid, t r u e ,nConns)
)<>
(getname(req)==r equestSend || 
getname(req)==requestReceive)->(
(state = = STATE_PENDING | | 
state==STATE_SLEEP)
-> _setConnectionStateProtocolReadWrite( 
tid ,
getcid(req) ,
STATE_TRANSACTION ,
getnewprotoco l (re q ) ,
getname(req)==requestReceive ,
getname(req)==requestSend).
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid, true,nConns)+
(st at e = = STATE_BREAK | | 
state==STATE_DISCONNECT)
-> _log(tid,LogRemoteHostClosedUnexpectedly(getcid(req))). 
TCP_ProcessRequest_Close(tid,getcid(req),nConns)+
(st at e = = STATE_EVENT | | 
state==SOCK_FREE || 
state==SOCK_ACCEPT || 
state==SOCK_READING || 
state==SOCK_WRITING || 
state==SOCK_SHUTDOWN || 
state==STATE_TRANSACTION)
-> _log(tid,LogSendReceiveForsingIllegalStateSwitch(getcid(req),
STATE_TRANSACTION)).
error(CriticalLog).
TCP_ProcessRequest_Close(tid,getcid(req),nConns)
)<>
(getname(req)==requestWakeUp)->(
(state = = STATE_PENDING | | 
state==STATE_SLEEP)
-> _setConnectionStateReadWrite(t i d ,getcid(r e q ) ,
STATE_TRANSACTION,f alse,false). 
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)<>
(st at e = = STATE_BREAK | | 
st at e = = STATE_EVENT | | 
state==SOCK_FREE || 
state==SOCK_ACCEPT || 
state==SOCK_READING || 
state==SOCK_WRITING || 
state==SOCK_SHUTDOWN)
->_log(tid,LogWakeUpForsingIllegalStateSwitch(getcid(req),state)). 
error(CriticalLog).
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)
)
)
